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WHAT  IS THE ROLE of innovation  in productivity  growth, and to what 
extent has a change in either the pace or the character  of innovation 
contributed  to weak productivity  growth  in the past fifteen years? We 
have collected new data on innovation that support the view that a 
slowing  of innovation  played  an important  part  in the decline  in produc- 
tivity growth. 
We report  here the first stage in an in-depth  investigation  of produc- 
tivity in particular  industries.  This first stage focuses on two manufac- 
turing  industries,  chemicals  and textiles. Certainly,  more  industries  are 
needed to verify the findings,  but the two industries  chosen provide a 
good contrast. The chemical industry  is capital-intensive  and process- 
based, and relies heavily on its own research and development. The 
textile industry  is less capital-intensive,  uses an equipment-based  tech- 
nology, and  relies primarily  on externally  generated  innovations.  1 
In addition  to collecting innovation  data, we interviewed  managers, 
Helpful comments  by Brookings  Panel members and by Mike Scherer are acknowl- 
edged.  Research assistance  at Brookings was provided by Nathaniei S.  Levy,  who also 
prepared extensive  background material on the textile  industry.  Research assistance  at 
Drexel was provided by K. R. Gundala, Christine Schillings, Russell Lavery, and Richard 
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1.  According to the Business  Week R&D Scoreboard (July 8,  1985), pp. 86-106,  the 
chemical companies  in their survey  spent $3.7 billion on R&D in 1984, representing 3.1 
percent  of  sales,  or $4,250  per worker.  The textile  and apparel industries  spent  $81.5 
million on R&D, which was 0.8 percent of sales and $571 per worker. 
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engineers, and scientists in the two industries about the relationship 
between  innovation  and  productivity  and  about  other  possible causes of 
slow productivity growth in the  1970s. We conclude that although 
innovation  was an  important  part  of the story  of the slowdown,  structural 
shocks also retarded  growth. 
Direct Measurement  of Innovation 
Innovations  in production  technology begin with a "fishing  expedi- 
tion," an attempt  to see whether  progress  is possible. The project  may 
be stimulated  by an advance  in basic science, but more  often it is simply 
a search  for a new and  better  way to apply  existing  scientific  knowledge. 
If successful, the initial  search  process will lead to an invention,  and  the 
invention  may result  in one or more  patents. 
Not all such inventions are developed to the point of commercial 
introduction.  Many  are  discarded  because they are not expected to lead 
to successful new products and processes. For those that are carried 
forward,  the bulk of the total research  and development  (R&D)  cost is 
incurred  after  the invention  stage, and there  is a substantial  lag before a 
new product  or process is ready for commercial  introduction.2  It is at 
the point of commercial  introduction  that the new product  or process is 
described  as an innovation. 
PROCESS  INNOVATIONS 
New processes are developed  for a variety  of reasons-to  make  new 
products,  to produce  with lower levels of pollution,  to save energy, or, 
most important,  to improve  productivity.  New plants that incorporate 
the new productivity-enhancing  technology or existing plants that are 
modified  to use the  new  technology  will  have  a higher  level of productivity 
than will plants with older technology. Obviously the new technology 
does not take over right  away-the  level of productivity  does not  jump. 
But the availability  of the new technology  provides  the means  by which 
productivity  growth  can  take  place. We expect, therefore,  that  the larger 
2.  According to officials at the Du Pont Company,  90-95  percent of R&D costs  are 
incurred after the idea or invention has been formulated. Martin Neil Baily and Alok K. Chakrabarti  611 
is the flow of process innovations,  the higher  is the rate of productivity 
growth. 
PRODUCT  INNOVATIONS 
Process innovations are not the only or even the main source of 
productivity  enhancement  for U.S.  manufacturing  as a whole. New 
products  supplied  to an industry  from  outside and new products  devel- 
oped within an industry  also improve  productivity.  The most obvious 
example is new equipment  developed by the machinery  industry  and 
supplied to another industry. For example, in the 1970s new textile 
equipment  developed by the European  and Japanese  machinery  indus- 
tries replaced  the mechanical  shuttle  with air or water  jets and brought 
about  dramatic  productivity  benefits.  Such  innovations  will always  raise 
labor  productivity.  In practice  they raise multifactor  productivity  also, 
because when the stock of capital of an industry is computed, the 
machinery  is priced in such a way that part of the innovation in the 
machinery-producing  industry  is attributed  to multifactor  productivity 
growth  in the machinery-using  industry.3 
New products  produced  within  an industry  also enhance  its produc- 
tivity. In the period  after  a new product  is introduced,  productivity  rises 
rapidly  as the scale of production  increases and the company moves 
down a learning  curve. New products may also indicate new process 
developments. In the chemical industry, where product and process 
innovations  are closely related, much of the R&D cost associated with 
a new product  is spent  on developing  the process used to produce  it. 
As  price indexes are now constructed by the Bureau of  Labor 
Statistics, not all of the productivity  improvement  resulting  from new 
product development is  reflected in official productivity measures. 
Initially, a new product  is excluded from the output price index. It is 
linked into the index once it is established. The dollar value of the 
production  of new products is counted right away, however, so that 
nominal  output  always  includes  new products.  In computing  real  output 
for productivity  purposes, therefore, nominal output, including new- 
3.  F. M. Scherer discusses  the effect of innovation in supplying industries on produc- 
tivity in using industries.  See  "Using  Linked Patent and R&D Data to Measure Interin- 
dustry Technology  Flows,"  in Zvi Griliches,  ed.,  R&D, Patents  and Productivity (Uni- 
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products,  is deflated  by a price  index  that  excludes at least some of these 
products. 
The nature  of the product  cycle in most industries  is that  old products 
have a standard  technology and profit  margins  are gradually  squeezed 
by competition. New products are typically introduced with higher 
margins.  These high margins  are then effectively counted as high real 
output, so that the introduction  of new products increases measured 
productivity.  On the other hand, new products  usually have declining 
relative prices, because of the learning  curve and rapid productivity 
gains. And  until  the new product  is linked  into the price  index, the direct 
effect of this is missed. However, since a typical new product  is just a 
variant  of an old product,  the old products  do have to compete with the 
new products.  The rapid  productivity  gains that  occur for new products 
also hold down the prices of old products  and, hence, reduce  inflation  in 
the industry  price index even if it excludes these new products. 
Without  more  information  it is impossible  to be sure  of the size of the 
new-product  bias in productivity  measurement.  New products do in- 
crease measured  productivity,  but it is likely that the increase as now 
measured  is somewhat  understated  relative  to a true  economic measure 
of productivity.4 
COLLECTING  THE  INNOVATION  DATA 
In view of the complexity of the innovation  process, the question is 
where to go to collect data on innovations and what innovations to 
include. Previous studies of innovation  have emphasized  only the big 
breakthroughs.'  But small, incremental innovations can be equally 
important.  A breakthrough  innovation-the  shuttle-less weaving ma- 
chine-was  available  by the 1970s,  but  could not be used throughout  the 
textile industry  until  successive generations  of new machinery  had  been 
developed  that  both perfected  the technology  and  adapted  it to produce 
the great  variety  of fabrics  that  the industry  makes. The new machinery 
developed over fifteen years or more made up a near-constant  flow of 
equipment  innovations  that  contributed  to productivity  growth. 
Our  decision was to collect a file of innovations  for the two industries 
4.  Without implicating him in our conclusions,  we would like to thank Jack E. Triplett, 
until recently at the Bureau of Labor Statistics,  for a helpful conversation on this issue. 
5.  Gellman Research Associates,  Inc., Indicators of International  Trends in Techno- 
logical  Innovation,  Study  prepared for the National  Science  Foundation  (Washington, 
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selected, chemicals and textiles, using the trade  periodicals  that serve 
each.6  New products  developed within  the industry  and supplied  to the 
industry are both advertised and described extensively in articles in 
thesejournals.  New processes are  also noted  and  described,  if not  always 
advertised. Although  companies frequently  keep secret the details of 
new process technology,  the existence of a process innovation  and  some 
information  about its character generally are reported. We double- 
checked  our  findings  with  industry  engineers  to learn  whether  our  search 
procedure  had missed significant  innovations,  particularly  new process 
developments. 
Our  research  assistants  were graduate  students  at Drexel University 
who had at least undergraduate  training  in chemical  or textile engineer- 
ing. We trained them in the selection criteria described below, and 
monitored  their  performance. 
Although  the assistants knew of the general  goals of the project, no 
one involved had  a preconceived  view that  innovation  either  had or had 
not slowed after 1973.  In previous work, Baily had argued  that factors 
other  than  innovation  were responsible  for the productivity  slowdown.7 
Chakrabarti,  who supervised  the data  collection, is primarily  interested 
in the management  aspects of innovation  and how corporate  strategies 
towards  innovation  are determined. 
Based  on advice  from  chemical  engineers  at  Drexel  and  in  the  industry, 
we established  four categories of chemicals  innovation  (products,  pro- 
cesses,  equipment, and instruments)  and set up criteria for judging 
whether  a new item in fact represented  something  significantly  new or 
improved.  We tracked  innovations  originating  both within  and outside 
the industry.  We  judged  new chemical  products  to be innovations  if they 
were chemically  new (that  is, had  new physical  or structural  properties), 
a significant  modification  of an  existing  chemical,  or  chemically  reformed 
or recompounded  for different  applications.  A new chemical process 
had to show changed inputs or yields or produce a new product. An 
equipment  innovation, often incorporated  into new processes, had to 
operate  at new physico-chemical  parameters  or process new materials. 
A new instrument  had to be able to measure  with greater  precision,  in a 
6.  For chemicals, the periodicals  covered were Chemical  Engineering,  Chemical 
Engineering Progress,  Chemical  Engineering  News,  and Chemical  Week. For textiles, 
the journals were Textile World, Textile Industries, American Dyestuff Reporter, Textiles 
Colors and Chemicals,  and America's  Textile Reporter. 
7.  Martin  Neil Baily, "Productivity  and the Services of Capital  and Labor,"  BPEA, 
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changed  environment,  or over a wider  range,  the operation  of chemical 
processes. 
The textile innovations  were similarly  classified and filtered, based 
on advice from  textile engineers  at the Philadelphia  College  of Textiles. 
The industry  develops a small  number  of process innovations  for dyeing 
and finishing, which use process technologies similar  to those in the 
chemical industry. The principal  way in which innovations improve 
productivity  in the textile industry  is through  new textile machinery.  We 
judged new equipment  to be an innovation  if it showed improvements 
over existing equipment  in such characteristics  as speed of operation, 
ability  to handle  new materials,  or reduced  input  requirements. 
Instrument  innovations in dyeing and finishing  are also similar to 
those described  in the chemical  industry.  Instruments  are used, too, in 
spinning  and weaving, where they can sense the characteristics  of the 
fiber  and control the machinery  to allow more rapid  operation  and less 
breakage. 
Innovations  in textile material  inputs, which consist of new fibers, 
finishes,  and  dyes, overlap  with  the chemical  product  innovations.  Most 
of these inputs come from the chemical industry, although separate 
chemicals are frequently combined into finishes and dyes within the 
textile industry. Product  innovations  take the form of new yarns and 
fabrics. 
Our coverage of innovations was rather comprehensive. For the 
period 1967-82, we found 574 process innovations and 2,773 new 
products  in the chemical industry  and 2,047 equipment  innovations  in 
textiles. Once  the innovations  had  been collected, we asked  the chemical 
and textile engineers  to review the files, report  on the completeness of 
our coverage, and rank  the innovations  by technical importance.  This 
ranking  process is still  going  on. We report,  below, rankings  on some of 
the more  important  innovation  categories. 
Innovation and Productivity 
The chemical industry, defined as SIC 28, but excluding the drug 
industry (SIC 283), achieved rapid multifactor productivity (MFP) 
growth until 1973, when growth slowed substantially.  Unadjusted  for 
capacity  utilization,  it slowed even more  after 1979,  as shown  in table 1. 
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Table 1. Multifactor  Productivity  Growth  in Chemicals  and Textiles,  Selected  Periods, 
196583a 
Percent  per year 
Industry  Period 
and series  1965-73  1973-79  1979-83 
Chemicals 
Unadjusted  3.09  1.73  0.98 
Adjustedb  3.10  1.91  2.53 
Textiles 
Unadjusted  2.61  3.37  3.18 
Adjustedb  2.73  3.56  3.38 
Source:  Data provided by the U.S.  Bureau of Economic  Analysis  and U.S.  Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
a.  Multifactor productivity  growth is calculated  as  the rate of growth of GDP originating in each  industry minus 
the weighted average of the growth rates of the capital and labor inputs. 
b.  The  adjusted  growth  rates  are  calculated  by  multiplying  the  capital  input  by  the  Federal  Reserve  Board's 
industry-specific  measure of capacity  utilization. 
for capacity  utilization  changes. The rate of capacity  utilization  for the 
chemical industry  has declined sufficiently  over time, especially since 
1979,  to affect the measure  of productivity.  An adjusted  growth  rate  for 
capital  input  to the industry  can be constructed  by multiplying  the cap- 
ital stock by the capacity utilization  rate reported  in industry-specific 
Federal  Reserve  Board  series. This  procedure  provides  a better  estimate 
of capital  services  actually  used. The measure  of MFP  growth  calculated 
from  the adjusted  capital  input  is shown  in table 1. Even  with  the adjusted 
measure, it remains  true that growth slowed substantially  after 1973. 
But, as a result of the adjustment,  we now see that there was some 
recovery  of growth  in 1979-83.  Excess capacity  in this  industry,  it seems, 
brings  about  a substantial  drop  in productivity  performance. 
Table 1 shows that the textile industry  experienced  no productivity 
slowdown at all after 1973. There was,  in fact, some acceleration. 
Moreover,  the capacity  adjustment  makes  only a minor  difference  to the 
productivity  numbers  in textiles. One reason  is that  the industry  had no 
widespread  excess capacity, as reported  in the FRB series. Another  is 
that since the industry  is not very capital-intensive,  a given amount  of 
excess capacity  has only a small  effect on multifactor  productivity. 
CHEMICAL  INNOVATIONS 
Table  2 reports  the basic data  on innovations  in the chemical  industry. 
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Table 2.  Innovations in the Chemical Industry, Selected Periods,  1967-82 
Average  number per year 
Chemical  Chemical 
Period  products  processes  Equipment  Instruments 
1967-73  332.0  39.0  107.9  29.6 
1974-79  38.8  32.3  56.7  18.2 
1980-82  64.7  34.7  104.7  54.0 
Source:  Authors' computations.  See  text description. 
with the number  of product  innovations  falling  by 215 percent, process 
innovations  by 18 percent, equipment  innovations  by 64 percent, and 
instrument  innovations by 49 percent.8  This is the kind of dramatic 
decline in innovation  that one would expect to see, given the decline in 
productivity  growth  that  took place in the industry. 
The  one series  that  does not  fit  well with  the overall  picture  of declining 
innovation  and productivity  growth  is the number  of chemical  process 
innovations.  Based  on other  information,  we suspected  that  the numbers 
in table 2 might  be understating  the decline in significant,  productivity- 
enhancing  process innovations after 1973. Certainly  the numbers  are 
called in question by a U.S. Department  of Commerce  report on the 
plastics and synthetic materials  industry  (a major  part of the chemical 
industry)  that concludes: "A major  factor underlying  the evolution of 
the industry's  input  structure  between 1958  and the early seventies was 
the great  wave of cost-saving  technical  advances which swept over the 
industry before 1970. . . . However,  it is also important to note that after 
1970,  the industry  developed  and  widely dispersed  only one major  cost- 
saving  innovation.  "9 
We do not agree  with  the Commerce  Department's  precise statement, 
but the idea that there was a wave of innovations  in the 1960s  that did 
not persist in the 1970s  was confirmed  for us by industry  experts. We 
therefore  evaluated  the process innovation  data carefully  to determine 
whether  there had been changes in the quality or the character  of the 
innovations  that  might  alter  the picture  provided  by the crude  numerical 
count of innovations  in table 2. Many  of the process innovations  in the 
file  are  not clearly  productivity-enhancing.  Many  have  an  environmental 
8. These  figures  are  calculated  as 100  times  the difference  in the natural  logs of the two 
numbers. 
9.  U.S.  Department of Commerce, The U.S. Plastics and Synthetic Materials Industry 
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Table 3.  Process Innovations in the Chemical Industry, by Type, Selected Periods, 
1967-82a 
Average  number  per year 
Type  of innovation 
Productivity-  Environment-  Energy- 
Period  enhancing  related  related 
1967-73  7.3  8.9  0.3 
1974-79  4.2  7.0  3.5 
1980-82  7.3  8.0  4.7 
a.  The innovations  were classified  by the authors. The three categories  above  are not exhaustive.  The remaining 
process  innovations  were primarily to produce a new or modified product. A few innovations could not be classified. 
aim-to  reduce  the toxic pollution  emitted  by existing  process technol- 
ogies. Many more change the character  or quality of the product. A 
number conserve energy. These last are productivity-enhancing,  of 
course, but will not have a full impact  on measured  multifactor  produc- 
tivity, given that  energy  inputs  are still valued  in 1972  dollars. 
Table 3 gives data on the number  of process innovations  that can be 
identified  as being  productivity-enhancing,  environment-related,  or en- 
ergy-related.  It is striking  both how few productivity-enhancing  process 
innovations  there were and how much greater  their post-1973  drop-off 
(55  percent)  was  than  the  total  decline  in  process  innovations  (18  percent). 
The table shows the importance  of the environmental  movement  and 
anti-pollution  efforts, but does not provide evidence that they were a 
major  cause of the post-1973  slowdown. Over the whole period, more 
innovations were directed towards reducing pollution than towards 
productivity  enhancement.  But there were actually  more  environment- 
related  process innovations  before 1973  than there were from 1974  to 
1979. 
The energy-related  innovations show exactly the pattern  to be ex- 
pected. There were almost no innovations  in this area before 1973,  but 
several  afterwards.  The diversion  of R&D  effort  towards  saving  energy 
may have contributed  to the reduction  of innovations  that save capital 
and  labor.  10 
Our  next step was to ask the chemical  engineers  who had advised us 
initially  to go over the file to rank  the innovations  by technical impor- 
10. This  hypothesis  has been emphasized  by Dale W. Jorgenson,  "Energy  Prices  and 
Productivity  Growth,"  Scandinavian  Journal  of Economics,  vol.  83, no.  2 (1981),  pp. 
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Table 4.  Process Innovations in the Chemical Industry, by Technical Importance, 
Selected Periods, 1967-82 
Average  number  per year 
Produictivity-enhancing  All processes 
Radical or  Radical or 
major  Significant  Minor  major  Significant  Minor 
Period  importance improvement  importance importance improvement  importance 
1967-73  0.6  4.1  2.6  3.1  22.7  13.1 
1974-79  0.3  2.8  1.0  2.7  15.8  13.8 
1980-82  0.7  5.7  1.0  2.3  23.7  8.7 
Source:  Authors' computations. 
tance, according  to whether they were radical, or major;  a significant 
improvement;  or minor, or imitative."1  As table 4 shows, the quality 
rankings  do not change the picture much.12 The data in the table on 
productivity-enhancing  innovations  slightly  weaken the case that inno- 
vation declined, for they show that the falloff in minor productivity- 
enhancing  innovations was greater  than the decline in significant  im- 
provements.  The falloff  in radical  and major  innovations,  however, was 
even larger  than the decline in total productivity-enhancing  innovation 
shown in table 3. And when all process innovations  are considered,  the 
quality  ranking  strengthens  the case for a decline. The number  of minor 
innovations  per year actually  increased  in 1974-79. 
We also obtained  quality  rankings  for the chemical  product  innova- 
tions to see whether  the overall  decline in product  innovation  shown in 
table 2 might simply reflect a falling off of minor changes. Table 5 
indicates  that  this is not the case. As one would  expect, the vast majority 
of all  product  innovations  are  fairly  minor,  but  all three  rankings  showed 
a precipitous  decline. Only  one major  product  innovation  occurred  after 
1973,  according  both to our file and to the engineer  who did most of the 
rankings. 
The Period  1980-82.  Although  the period 1980-82 consists of only 
three  years  and  encompasses  two sharp  recessions,  the data  nevertheless 
show signs of a recovery in process and equipment  innovation  in the 
11. Rankings  were provided  for us by Dipak Roy and William  Herring, Amoco 
Chemicals;  Edward  Hogan, The PQ Corporation;  Deepak Agarwal,  Stearns  Catalytic; 
R. Mutherasan  and  Elihu  Grossman,  Drexel  University. 
12. The work of Samuel Hollander  on the chemical industry  indicates that small 
process innovations  may be as important  to productivity  growth  as large  ones. See The 
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Table 5.  Product Innovations in the Chemical Industry, by Technical Importance, 
Selected Periods, 1967-82 
Average  number  per year 
Radical or 
major  Significant  Minor 
Period  importance  improvement  importance 
1967-73  2.4  96.9  232.6 
1974-79  0.2  9.0  29.7 
1980-82  0.0  5.7  59.0 
Source:  Authors' computations. 
chemical  industry.  Moreover,  the productivity  data  in table 1 also seem 
to indicate  some recovery  of growth  in this industry  after 1979.  Thus  the 
correlation  between innovation  and productivity  performance  evident 
in  1967-73 and 1974-79 is continued after 1979. However, we  are 
unwilling  to put much  weight on such a short, turbulent  period  and will 
wait to see what  future  years demonstrate. 
TEXTILE  INNOVATIONS 
Table  6 reports  the basic data  for the textile industry,  defined  as SIC 
22. The  most  important  component  of innovation  for  textile  productivity, 
new equipment,  maintained  continued  vigor  after 1973,  the result  of new 
generations of machinery  that have consistently raised weaving and 
spinning  speeds and  reduced  the labor  required  for restart. 
The table does show some decline in the total number  of process 
innovations.  In the textile industry,  however, in contrast  to the chemical 
industry,  when  the process innovations  are  classified  by type, as in table 
7, we find no decline in the flow of productivity-enhancing  process 
innovations. The data in tables 6 and 7, therefore, provide important 
support  for the link between innovation  and productivity  performance. 
After 1973,  the textile industry  showed  no slowdown  either  in productiv- 
ity growth or in its two main production-related  categories of innova- 
tion-equipment and  productivity-enhancing  processes. 
The other innovation  categories  in table 6 do decline somewhat  after 
1973.  The drop-off  in instrument  innovations  is not of great  significance. 
Based on historical  experience, the decline in the flow of new fibers 
could  have been expected to be more  important  because  changes  in fiber 
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Table 6.  Innovations in the Textile Industry, Selected Periods,  1967-82 
Average  number  per year 
Dyes and 
Period  Equipment  Processes  Instruments  Fibers  finishes 
1967-73  134.5  17.4  53.9  19.0  267.0 
1974-79  140.5  14.8  44.3  11.0  299.5 
1980-82  154.3  9.3  37.7  4.0  180.0 
Source:  Authors' calculations.  See  text description. 
from natural to man-made fibers that has been crucial to productivity 
growth continued rapidly throughout the 1970s and thus diminished the 
significance of the decline in the number of new man-made fibers after 
1973. This development  is discussed  in more detail below. 
THE  RESPONSE  OF  INNOVATIONS  TO  DEMAND 
Although  the correlation between  the patterns of productivity  and 
innovation for the two industries is clear, the direction of causality  is 
open to question. Jacob Schmookler has argued that innovation responds 
to  demand  rather than being  driven  by  exogenous  developments  in 
technology.13  One might conjecture  that weak  demand after  1973 ad- 
versely affected both innovation and productivity. 
It is true that recessions  delay some new product introductions and 
that low  investment  reduces  the  productivity  impact of process  and 
equipment innovations.  But the simple facts of the chemical and textile 
industries do not fit the Schmookler  view.  Both chemicals  and textiles 
experienced  weak demand after 1973. But one industry had low inno- 
vation and productivity growth, and the other did not. The differential 
experience  of the two industries is not explained by demand. 
Two Industry  Case Studies 
We now turn to more detailed case studies of the chemical and textile 
industries to explore more carefully whether innovation is the primary 
source of productivity growth; whether innovation has actually slowed 
and if so, why; and what other major influences there are on productivity 
and how they have changed. 
13. Jacob  Schmookler,  Invention  and Economic  Growth  (Harvard  University  Press, 
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Table 7.  Process Innovations in the Textile Industry, by Type, Selected Periods, 
1967-82a 
Average number  per year 
Type  of innovation 
Productivity-  Environment-  Energy- 
Period  enhancing  related  related 
1967-73  4.4  0.7  0.3 
1974-79  5.0  1.0  0.7 
1980-82  4.3  0.3  0.0 
Source:  Authors' calculations.  See  text description. 
a.  Categories  are not exhaustive.  See  note to table 3. 
The sources of information  for the case studies include in-depth 
interviews  with personnel  in major  companies  in both the chemical  and 
textile industries,  as well as studies  prepared  by others. Both industries 
have been studied exhaustively by economists, government  agencies, 
and investment  houses, so there  is no shortage  of information.  Many  of 
the secondary  sources also used company  interviews. 
Clearly, a small number  of interviews cannot provide a statistical 
sample for hypothesis testing in a formal way.  In any case,  these 
questions are probably not amenable to direct quantitative  testing. 
Rather,  the case studies  will suggest  answers  to the questions  posed. 
The interviews were formalized  to the following extent. Meetings 
were set up with both technical R&D personnel and plant managers. 
Notes from  the interviews  were written  up into  narrative  summaries  that 
were submitted  to interviewers  for  comments  on accuracy  and  complete- 
ness.  14 Although  a formal  questionnaire  was not administered,  all those 
surveyed  were asked about  innovation  and  productivity  growth  and  the 
relationship  between them over the past fifteen to twenty years. They 
were asked in general  about  reasons for any reported  trends  and asked 
specifically about the importance of such factors as energy prices, 
regulation,  work  effort, and  foreign  trade. 
THE  CHEMICAL  INDUSTRY 
The great  majority  of output  in the chemical  industry  consists of bulk 
or commodity  chemicals.  15  Bulk  chemicals  include  building  block  chem- 
14. Copies  of the summaries  are  available  from  the authors. 
15. Major  secondary  sources of information  for this industry  include First Boston 
Corporation,  Analysis  of  Chemical  Production  Capacities  (Boston,  1977),  and  U.S. 622  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1985 
icals, such as benzene and ethylene, that are used in later chemical 
processes; organic  intermediates,  such as formaldehyde  and methanol; 
and final-use chemicals, such as fibers (nylon, polyester), plastics 
(polyethylene,  polyvinyl  chloride),  inorganic  chemicals  (soda,  chlorine), 
and fertilizers (ammonia, phosphates), that are shipped out of the 
chemical industry.  The remainder  of the output comes from specialty 
companies. We interviewed  employees of two large  producers  of bulk 
chemicals, Du Pont and Monsanto  Co., and of one specialty  company, 
the Minnesota  Mining  and Manufacturing  Corp., 3M. 
Bulk Chemical  Companies.  Employees  at both Du Pont and Mon- 
santo confirmed  that productivity  had slowed after 1973  and that the 
pace of innovation had declined in the 1970s. Both companies used 
internal  productivity  measures based on gross output per employee. 
Estimates  of the slowing  in the pace of innovation  were more  subjective. 
Virtually  everyone with whom we spoke confirmed  the existence of a 
slowdown, but R&D staff generally  described  it as less significant  than 
did the production  staff. R&D staff blamed  the slowdown  on shrinking 
R&D budgets in the early 1970s. Other staff indicated  that the R&D 
budgets  were cut because the technological  opportunities  were limited. 
At the end  of World  War  II  immense  technological  opportunities  awaited 
exploitation,  partly as a result of developments  stimulated  by the war 
itself and partly because of a natural  cycle in the technology of the 
industry,  but  by the 1970s  research  efforts  were running  into diminishing 
returns.  A new impetus  to technological  development  was needed. 
Du Pont discovered  nylon in 1935.  Its commercial  development  was 
delayed by the war, but its discovery spawned a whole series of 
innovations  falling  in two waves, one in the 1950s  and one in the 1960s. 
These innovations were not limited to new fibers, because the new 
chemistry stimulated  by nylon led to many other applications. Five 
thousand  new polymers  were developed in the first wave alone. In the 
1950s  and 1960s,  process innovations  went along with the new product 
development, and successive generations  of new process technology 
produced  large  productivity  gains. Although  Du Pont used patent pro- 
tection and very restricted  access to information  in order  to maintain  a 
technological  lead in production  methods, by the 1970s the waves of 
Department of Commerce, The U.S. Plastics and Synthetic Materials Industry Since 1958. 
Innovation  in the chemical  industry  has been studied  extensively  in the research  program 
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innovation  had  run  their  course, and  the opportunities  for rapid  advance 
in existing  product  lines were limited. 
Monsanto  achieved rapid  productivity  gains until 1970  primarily  by 
building  larger  and  larger  plants.  16 By the 1970s,  however, the potential 
for scale-related design and materials innovations had largely been 
exhausted. 
According to staff at both companies, there is a very close link 
between  innovation  and  productivity  growth  in the long  run.  In the short 
run, organizational  and managerial  changes and improvements  in work 
practices can make a substantial  difference. But even these improve- 
ments come as part  of the learning  curve associated with new products 
and processes. If a company  were to fail to make innovations,  produc- 
tivity growth  would slow and stop after a few years. The consensus at 
both companies was that the slowing in the pace of innovation had 
contributed  significantly  to the slowdown in productivity  growth. The 
interview  responses thus provide  independent  support  for the quantita- 
tive results  given earlier. 
When  asked  about  other  causes of the productivity  growth  slowdown 
after 1973,  interviewees  cited slow growth  in product  demand  as being 
at least as important  as the slowing of innovation.  In neither  company 
was the slow growth in demand due primarily  to the business cycle, 
although  obviously the recession of 1974-75 did play a role. The two 
main causes cited for slow demand growth were structural-foreign 
trade and energy prices. The reduced number  of product  innovations 
itself also curbed  demand  growth. 
Although  the U.S. chemical industry  does face direct foreign com- 
petition, the source of its trade difficulties was not its own foreign 
competition,  but  that  of its customers.  The  textile  and  apparel  industries, 
heavily affected by foreign competition  in the 1970s, sharply  reduced 
the growth rate of their purchases  of chemicals, particularly  synthetic 
fibers.17  At the same time, petrochemicals  suffered  from the increased 
16. This interaction  between innovation  and economies of scale in the chemical 
industry  has been analyzed  by Richard  C. Levin, "Technical  Change  and  Optimal  Scale: 
Some Evidence  and Implications,"  Southern  Economic  Journal,  vol. 44 (October  1977), 
pp. 208-21. 
17. It should  be stated  for the record  that  Du Pont  staff  said that  they were ready  and 
willing  to operate  under  a regime  of free trade, provided  they were free to sell fiber  to 
whoever is producing  textiles. Because of the multi-fiber  agreement  and various trade 
restrictions,  they are not allowed  to compete  freely  overseas. 624  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1985 
cost of oil and natural  gas feedstocks, which raised final prices and 
caused a sharp  reduction  in demand  growth.18 
In both companies, the view was that the change in the trend of 
demand  growth had an impact  on their productivity  for as long as ten 
years. Interviewees acknowledged  that they had been slow to realize 
that the trend  had changed. Because of the several-year-long  planning 
and construction  period for new chemical plants, large-scale  state-of- 
the-art  plants, designed  to achieve economies of scale and maintain  or 
increase market share, continued to be brought on line even when 
company  officials  recognized  that  demand  had  fallen.  These plants  were 
then operated below capacity and thus very inefficiently,  production 
worker  requirements  in such plants  being  almost  independent  of output 
levels. 19 
Specialty Chemical Companies.  In addition to the producers of bulk 
chemicals, the chemical  industry  features  smaller  specialty  companies. 
The large  diversified  companies,  too, have specialty  chemical  divisions. 
We interviewed employees of 3M, a company that produces a great 
many different  chemicals, about half of which are sold internally  to its 
other divisions. Those interviewees described 3M's experience in the 
1970s  as being  very different  from  that  of the large-scale  producers. 
The chemical operations at 3M are not very capital-intensive.  A 
specialist in versatility, 3M is the sole source of many of its products, 
and in some cases it produces the entire year's output in one or two 
days. The equipment  is then cleaned and used for another chemical. 
Because  of the diversity  of products,  3M's  internal  productivity  numbers 
are of limited  value, but employees  judged that there had been little or 
no productivity  slowdown  after 1973.  Pursuing  their  traditional  innova- 
tion strategy  of making  continual  product  improvements  or developing 
new products  related  to existing ones, they sensed no slowdown in the 
pace of those innovations  in the 1970s.  Nor did the company  experience 
excess capacity after 1973. As demand  growth slowed, 3M followed a 
strategy  of minimizing  investment  expenditures  and making  more effi- 
cient use of their  plants. 
18. The recession  cut demand  after 1973,  and  then  feedstock  prices  increased  as price 
controls  were  lifted. 
19. There  is actually  very  little  direct  labor  used  in  a large  chemical  plant.  The  problem 
of excess labor  apparently  included  additional  sales and  clerical  staff  hired  in anticipation 
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Although  the experience  of this specialty  chemical  company  and  that 
of the bulk producers differ sharply, they are not inconsistent. The 
specialty company suffered  no slowdown in innovation,  no slowdown 
in productivity,  and no excess capacity. 
Other Causes of the Productivity Slowdown.  Employees  of the three 
companies  also responded  to questions about other possible causes of 
the decline in productivity  growth. None thought that labor quality, 
work effort, or related labor issues had played an important  role in 
changes in the trend of productivity  growth. One company reported 
labor  conflict  occurring  for a short  period  around  1975. 
The problems  associated with excess capacity  are, of course, linked 
to capital  services. But beyond this, none of the interviewees  reported 
that accelerated obsolescence had been a major difficulty for their 
company, although  employees of all three cited examples tied to either 
regulation  or energy  costs. 
The  diversion  of R&D  resources  to meeting  environmental  regulatory 
requirements  or to saving  energy  was important  for Monsanto  and 3M, 
less so for Du Pont. For the period 1973-79 half of Monsanto's R&D 
was environment-  or energy-related.  This  draining  of resources  contrib- 
uted to the decline  in the number  of cost-reducing  innovations. 
THE  TEXTILE  INDUSTRY 
The textile industry  is structured  very differently  from the chemical 
industry.20  It consists of a very large number  of firms, most of them 
small. There were 6,000 U.S. textile companies in 1973,  the largest of 
which, Burlington  Industries, Inc., had 5 percent of the market. The 
next largest, J.P. Stevens and Co., had 3 percent  in 1979.21  Plant  sizes, 
too, are often small:  in 1979,  70 percent  of the plants  had  fewer than 100 
employees. Many of these small  plants and companies subcontract  for 
20. Major  secondary  sources  for this industry  include  The U.S. Textile  Mill  Products 
Industry: Strategies for the 1980's and Beyond (Center for Industrial Policy and Strategy, 
University  of South Carolina,  1982);  U.S. Bureau  of Labor Statistics, Technology  and 
Manpower in the Textile Industry ofthe 1970's, Bulletin 1578  (GPO, 1968); The Competitive 
Status  of the U.S.  Fibers,  Textiles, and Apparel Complex (Washington, D.C.:  National 
Academy  Press, 1983). 
21.  See  The U.S.  Textile Mill Products  Industry,  p. 5-la,  pp. 5-27,  and Gordon P. 
Yale,  The Textile Industry in Transition, Report 532 (Stanford Research Institute,  1974), 
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the larger companies in what is called "jobbing"  -performing  such 
specific  tasks as finishing  the woven fabric. 
We interviewed employees of two of the larger companies in the 
industry,  as well as staff at the Philadelphia  College of Textiles and the 
Textile Research  Institute  in Princeton.  The latter  were able to provide 
information  about  both  large  and  small  companies  in the industry.  Partly 
because many textile companies  are privately  owned and release little 
information, and partly because of political negotiations that were 
proceeding  on textile quotas at the time of this study, the companies 
asked not to have their names associated with particular  views. Inter- 
ested readers  may contact us for further  information  about  the specific 
companies  interviewed. 
Both industry  personnel  and secondary  sources agree  that  the rate  of 
innovation  and productivity  growth in textiles remained  strong in the 
1973-79  period. Again, there is confirmation  of the pattern  we reported 
in our own data. 
The industry  experienced  very rapid  output  and  demand  growth  until 
the late 1960s  and  early 1970s,  when foreign  competition  began  to erode 
market  growth. Textile exports were reduced, and imports  of foreign- 
made  apparel  increased.  The textile industry  itself, however, still had a 
trade  surplus  in 1981. 
Unlike the chemical industry, the textile industry adapted to the 
change  in growth  without  creating  persistent  excess capacity.  The older 
and less efficient  plants  were closed, and employment  fell rapidly.  One 
company  reported  that  it had  actually  increased  its capital  utilization  in 
the 1970s, moving to seven-day-a-week,  three-shift  operation  in order 
to minimize investment requirements.  Differences in the technology 
account for the ability of the textile industry  to adjust  to lower output 
growth.22  The companies do not have large capital-intensive  process- 
based plants and do not build much ahead of demand. Textiles and 
chemicals  also have different  labor  relations  traditions.  Textile compa- 
nies do not engage  in much  labor  hoarding. 
One of the important  sources of rapid  and continuing  productivity 
growth cited by interviewees-the  shift from natural to man-made 
fibers-was  not well reflected  in the innovation  data. The production  of 
22. The textile  industry  has high  average  variable  costs and  low fixed  costs relative  to 
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textiles from natural  fibers  requires  numerous  steps before the yarn is 
woven. For cotton fabrics, for example, the cotton bales must first be 
broken  up and the cotton fibers  loosened and then blended. In the next 
step, "cording," the fibers  are cleaned and formed  into strands.  Three 
more  steps take  place  before  spinning:  "drawing"  the fibers,  "winding" 
the strands, and "roving," which reduces the size of the strands  and 
winds them  into fibers  ready  for spinning.  After spinning,  the yarn  must 
still move to the "winding and warping" step before it is ready for 
weaving. 
Synthetic  fibers,  provided  by the chemical  industry,  often bypass the 
stages before spinning  and are sometimes  even spun in chemical  plants 
before  being  sold. Moreover,  because  of their  special  physical  properties, 
synthetic fibers can be spun and woven at very high speeds. These 
efficiently  produced  new fibers  took over the market.  In 1957  cotton and 
wool made  up 71 percent  of all U.S. fiber  consumption.  The proportion 
had fallen to 56 percent by 1966 and to 24 percent by 1981. Textile 
industry  productivity  growth  was thus boosted throughout  the 1970s  by 
the waves of product  innovation  in the chemical  industry  that  took place 
in the 1950s  and 1960s.  It is worth noting  that  foreign  trade  contributed 
to this productivity  enhancement. In 1981, the United States had a 
substantial  net trade  surplus  in man-made  yarn  and  fabric  and  a substan- 
tial deficit  in cotton fabric.  The U.S. textile and apparel  industries  have 
maintained  their comparative  advantage  most effectively in synthetic 
fabric. 
Successive generations  of new equipment  have  also continued  to raise 
textile productivity  growth. Carrying  out only a small amount  of R&D 
itself, the industry  has  had  access to a constant  flow  of new technologies, 
generated  primarily  from equipment  suppliers.  The latest Swiss Sulzer 
automatic  looms can now weave 760 meters of denim  a minute, nearly 
four times the speeds achieved twenty years ago.23  Developments in 
spinning  technology have been just as dramatic.  Air  jets are replacing 
spindles,  just as they earlier  replaced  shuttles. Circulating  air currents 
now spin the yarn  into thread. 
Other  developments  in the industry  that might  have affected  produc- 
tivity were noted by the interviewees. Old capital became rapidly 
obsolete in the 1970s as new equipment  was installed and old plants 
23.  Figures are from the Economist  (27 July-2  August 1985), p. 82. 628  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1985 
closed.  Labor quality and work effort had no major influence on 
productivity  trends.  Increased  foreign  competition  encouraged  manage- 
ment  to introduce  more  productive  work  practices,  benefiting  productiv- 
ity in the past ten years. The industry  has been affected by economic 
regulation,  particularly  by Occupational  Safety and Health  Administra- 
tion requirements  for a clean work environment. Regulation  did not 
cause  a particularproductivity  slowdown  in  the 1970s,  however,  because 
the regulations in this area were introduced in the 1960s and then 
strengthened  over time. Finally,  new generations  of machinery  are more 
energy-intensive  than  prior  machinery. 
Consistency  with Existing R&D Studies 
We have found a striking pattern of declining innovation in the 
chemical  industry  that  supports  the hypothesis  that  the recent  slowdown 
in trend productivity  growth in U.S. manufacturing  was caused to an 
important  extent by a slowing of innovation. Our findings, however, 
appear  to contradict  empirical  studies  of R&D spending  across firms  or 
industries  that find  no reduction  of the impact  of R&D on productivity 
after 1973.24  We first  examine  these other studies and then explain  why 
we find  our own results  more  persuasive. 
The empirical  studies in question look at a cross section of firms  or 
industries  before  and  after 1973.  They estimate  the extent  to which  R&D 
has contributed  to cross-sectional  differences  in either the level or the 
rate of growth  of productivity,  and they find that this contribution  did 
not diminish significantly  after 1973. For example, the study by Zvi 
Griliches  estimates  a Cobb-Douglas  production  function: 
(1)  InQi=InA  +oln  K  +InLi+ynRi;  i=  1,. ..n, 
where Q is output,  A is a constant, K is capital, L is labor, and  R is an 
estimate of the stock of R&D capital, computed from annual R&D 
expenditures  just as the capital stock is computed, assuming some 
24. F. M. Scherer, "Inter-Industry  Technology Flows and Productivity  Growth," 
Review of Economics  and Statistics,  vol. 64 (November  1982), pp. 627-34;  Zvi Griliches, 
"Productivity,  R&D,  and  Basic  Research  at the Firm  Level in the 1970s,"  Working  Paper 
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depreciation  rate. The subscript runs over firms and the relation is 
estimated separately  for 1967, 1973, and 1977. Griliches  finds y rises 
somewhat from 1967 to 1973, and then falls again in 1977, but these 
changes  are not significant. 
The basic issue of interpretation  is whether  a decline  in technological 
progress would necessarily show up in the coefficient y in a cross- 
sectional  regression.  It  is not  obvious  that  the R&D  elasticity  is a function 
of opportunities.  It is true that R&D works in conjunction  with the set 
of such opportunities  to increase knowledge and hence productivity. 
But  capital  and  labor  also work  together  to produce  output.  And  changes 
in, say, labor-force quality would not necessarily affect the capital 
elasticity. Suppose "technology"  is instead  a separate  factor  of produc- 
tion. Then, since this variable  has been omitted from the regressions, 
changes  in it will be imputed  to shifts  in the constant, not to R&D. 
The second issue of interpretation,  one that reinforces the first, 
concerns the way a slowdown in technology might  strike  across firms. 
Consider two examples. In the first, R&D spending is  completely 
exogenous, and the slowdown strikes randomly  across firms, hitting 
some and not others. In the second, the slowdown strikes in the same 
way, but spending  responds  quickly  to changes in opportunities.  In the 
first  example  there  is no statistical  reason  why a slowdown  would  disturb 
the relation  of firm  R&D  stocks to productivity.  In the second example, 
one would expect that the firms  that were hit by a slowdown  would cut 
the amount of their R&D spending, while those in which prospects 
remained  good would maintain  spending. The total quantity  of R&D 
spending  would  fall, but not necessarily  the return  to R&D.25 
The results from the R&D studies are certainly at odds with our 
evidence that technological  opportunities  have declined. At this point, 
however, there is no established market model that determines how 
R&D spending  responds  to a slowdown, and no established  slowdown 
model that indicates  how the slowdown hits across firms  or industries. 
Without  these models, we prefer to accept the direct evidence of the 
innovation  data. 
25. This point is also made by F. M. Scherer  in "R&D and Declining  Productivity 
Growth,"  American  Economic  Review,  vol.  73 (May  1983, Papers  and Proceedings, 
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An Overall Assessment 
It has been known  for over twenty years that much of the observed 
increase  in labor  productivity  growth  over time  was attributable  directly 
to technical change, rather  than to capital accumulation.  Thus when 
growth slowed, it was natural  to expect that a slowing of technical 
change  was part  of the reason. The evidence of this paper  supports  that 
view. Case studies  of two major  industries  find  a clear relation  between 
their  innovation  and  productivity  patterns. 
While we recognize the importance  of looking at more industries  to 
confirm  the pattern,  the evidence so far suggests that the productivity 
slowdown in U.S. manufacturing  was caused by a combination  of two 
basic forces. Innovation  slowed down, and slow output  growth  caused 
resource  underutilization  in capital-intensive  process industries. 
Innovation  slowed because of the exhaustion  of technological  oppor- 
tunities that had opened up after World  War II, but it did not slacken 
equally in all industries.  The slowdown had more severe productivity 
consequences in capital-intensive  industries, where innovative pro- 
cesses often involve larger  scale production.  The technical  limits  of this 
approach  to cost reduction  were being reached  by the end of the 1960s 
and sometimes  even earlier,  as in electricity  generation.  The plateau  in 
technology  may not be permanent.  The chemical  industry,  for example, 
looks to biotechnology to provide a new wave of innovations in the 
1990s. 
The slowdown in output growth occurred partly because of the 
business  cycle, but  largely  because of the kinds  of structural  shocks-in 
particular,  growing  foreign  competition  and  higher  energy  prices-often 
cited in work  on productivity. 
Figure 1 illustrates a plausible slowdown scenario, combining  the 
effects of slowing innovation and low utilization rates of plants. U- 
shaped  cost curves are shown  for successive generations  of technology. 
The slowing  of innovation  is illustrated  by the fact that  the productivity 
increment  in moving from the "first" to the "second" generation  is 
greater  than  that  in moving  from  the "second" to the "third."  The cost 
reduction A  to B is greater than that B to  C. Actual productivity 
performance  is worse, however, because the third-generation  capital  is Martin Neil Baily and Alok K. Chakrabarti  631 
Figure 1.  Innovation, Utilization, and Productivitya 
Cost  per unit 
(inverse  of productivity) 
First  generation 
A 
Second  generation 
B  |J  Third  generation 
Output  per  plant 
a.  At "full" capacity the productivity gain is AB from first to second generation, BC from second to third. With excess 
capacity on third generation plants, the productivity gain falls to BD. 
being inefficiently  used. Thus the actual productivity  gain in the third 
period  is B to D, not B to C. This combination  of developments  appears 
to have characterized  the chemical  industry  in the 1970s. 
The hypothesis  that  capital  obsolescence is responsible  for diminish- 
ing productivity  growth, put forward  in earlier  work by Baily, receives 
little support from the cases studied in this paper, but the cases do 
illuminate  some of the puzzles and patterns  uncovered in that earlier 
work. Inefficient  use of large-scale  plants  does imply  a decline in capital 
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industries. Chronic  underuse  in the 1970s could also help explain the 
decline in the return  to capital  and its market  value. 
In  future  work  we plan  to study  innovation  and  productivity  in a major 
service industry.  The big area  of continued  or accelerated  innovation  in 
the 1970s  has been electronics. Apparently,  the productivity  benefits  of 
computerizing  white-collar  activities  have not been enough  to offset the 
slowing of innovation  in mature  manufacturing  industries.  We hope to 
find  out why. Comments 
and Discussion 
Richard  C. Levin: It may seem surprising  that  it is still  possible  to make 
a useful  contribution  to understanding  the  productivity  growth  slowdown 
of the 1970s,  but Martin  Neil Baily and Alok Chakrabarti  have done so. 
Unsatisfied that a full accounting can be rendered from the familiar 
lineup of suspects-energy  price shocks, adjustment  costs, depressed 
aggregate demand, inflation, and regulation-Baily  and Chakrabarti 
have pressed on to examine  whether  the decline in productivity  growth 
is at least in part  attributable  to a decline  in the rate  of innovation.  Since, 
in their very labor-intensive  efforts, they have looked at only two 
industries  and  found  different  answers  in each, we can rest assured  that 
the issue will remain  unresolved  for some time to come. 
Baily  and  Chakrabarti  are  very much  on the mark  when  they conclude 
that  technological  innovation  may  have  declined  despite  the  econometric 
evidence showing  no perceptible  decline  in the rate  of return  to R&D  or, 
alternatively,  in the elasticity of output with respect to the stock of 
accumulated  knowledge.  When  interindustry  or  intertemporal  variations 
in technological  opportunity-one  important  factor determining  inno- 
vation-are  not explicitly  incorporated  in the specification  of a produc- 
tivity growth equation, the estimated coefficient on R&D can remain 
constant  or even rise in the face of decreased  technological  opportunity. 
The authors  thus  proceed  to inquire  whether  the rate  of technological 
innovation  did in fact diminish  in two industries:  chemicals  and  textiles. 
The realized rate of innovation depends not only on the underlying 
opportunities  for  technical  advance,  but  on many  of the economic  factors 
commonly invoked in explaining  the productivity  growth slowdown. 
There is a demand  for new products and new processes as well as a 
supply. Thus, a finding  that the rate of innovation has declined in a 
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particular  industry  does not necessarily  imply that the pool of techno- 
logical  opportunities  has been depleted. 
One has to  applaud the authors for their painstaking  efforts in 
developing  several time series on innovations  from  articles  in the trade 
periodicals  of the two industries. But, for obvious reasons, such data 
can be misleading  if not used carefully.  All innovations  are not alike. As 
analysis  of patent  data  show, the distribution  of innovations  by economic 
value is highly  skewed. Indeed, the vast majority  of patents  turn  out to 
be worthless. Baily and  Chakrabarti  recognize  the problem  and  attempt 
to resolve it by having  experts rate  the quality  of innovations.  Unfortu- 
nately, they report  time series results  using  the quality-adjusted  data  for 
only one of the several categories of innovations  they study (chemical 
processes). We should  be wary  of accepting  conclusions  about  the other 
categories  of innovation  unless they are shown to hold for the subset of 
innovationsjudged  to be at least significant  improvements  in technology. 
Little that  I know about  the two industries  studied  gives me cause to 
quarrel  with the specific findings  of the authors'  innovation  counts and 
case studies. But I have one suggestion  that may give rise to a reinter- 
pretation of the data. The authors report a decline in productivity- 
enhancing  chemical process innovations after 1973, but only a slight 
decline in chemical process innovations  related to environmental  pro- 
tection. This suggests  that  environmental  regulation  was not responsible 
for diverting  innovative  effort  from  productivity  enhancement  to pollu- 
tion abatement.  But I conjecture  that  a different  pattern  would  appear  if 
1969, rather  than 1973, were used as the end point of the first period. 
Once upon a time, in  1973 in fact, I surveyed the same chemical 
engineering  journals  consulted  by Baily and Chakrabarti  in connection 
with my work  on scale-related  technical  change.  My distinct  impression 
was that precisely in 1970  there was a marked  diversion  of innovative 
activity  from  productivity  enhancement  to environmental  protection. 
I offer,  also, additional  evidence  that  bears  on Baily  and  Chakrabarti's 
conclusions about the rate of innovation in the chemical and textile 
industries.  In collaboration  with Alvin Klevorick, Richard  Nelson, and 
Sidney  Winter,  I recently  conducted  a survey  of R&D  executives in 130 
manufacturing  industries. Our principal  interests were to identify and 
measure  interindustry  differences  in the ability of firms  to appropriate 
returns  from new technology, and to characterize  interindustry  differ- 
ences in the nature  and  extent of technological  opportunities.  Several  of Martin Neil Baily and Alok K. Chakrabarti  635 
our questions are closely related  to the focus of the Baily-Chakrabarti 
inquiry.  Although  we did  not ask explicitly  whether  either  technological 
opportunities  or the rate of innovation  declined  or increased  during  the 
1980s,  we did  ask respondents  to assess whether  the rate  of introduction 
of new products  and new processes since 1970  has been slow or rapid. 
We also asked whether  the technological  opportunities  for introducing 
new products  and processes are more or less favorable  in the coming 
decade than  they were in the 1970s. 
We worked  at a more disaggregated  level of industry  detail than did 
Baily and Chakrabarti.  Thus, we have distinct  measures  for a consider- 
able number  of chemical  industries,  including  building-block  industries 
(inorganic  and  organic  chemicals),  intermediate  products  (plastic  mate- 
rials, synthetic  fibers,  and synthetic  rubber),  and more specialized  final 
products  (fertilizers  and  pesticides). Unfortunately,  we have no data  on 
the textile manufacturing  industry,  though  we do have responses from 
material  suppliers (synthetic fibers) and equipment suppliers (textile 
machinery). 
Table 1 presents some illustrative  data. The data are industry  mean 
responses to questions scored on a seven-point Likert scale: for inno- 
vation rates, the scale ranges  from  one, or very slow, to seven, or very 
rapid;  for future  opportunities  compared  with recent performance,  the 
range  is from  one, or much  worse, to seven, or much  better. 
The answers to our first  pair of questions provide some support  for 
the findings  of Baily and Chakrabarti,  although  the reported  innovation 
rates since 1970  must be compared  cross-sectionally  rather  than with 
each industry's  previous experience. In the basic chemical industries, 
respondents  reported  that the rate  of product  innovation  since 1970  has 
been substantially  slower than the average across all manufacturing 
industries. New process introductions  have been less frequent than 
average  in inorganic  chemicals, though  about  average  in organic  chem- 
icals. The rate of product  innovation  in synthetic fibers  has been a bit 
better, but still below average. On the other  hand,  confirming  Baily and 
Chakrabarti'  s conclusion  that  performance  was better  in specialty  chem- 
icals, we found  a relatively  rapid  rate  of product  innovation  in  pesticides. 
And we also found support  for the conclusions that the pace of textile 
machinery  innovation  may  not have slackened,  since the innovation  rate 
in this industry  was reported  to have been better  than  average. 
Another  way to compare  performance  across industries  is to sort the 636  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1985 
Table 1.  Industry Mean Responses to Selected Survey Questionsa 
Rate  of innovation  Current opportunities 
since  1970  compared  to 1970s 
Industry  Products  Processes  Products  Processes 
Inorganic  chemicals  3.1  3.2  3.9  3.9 
Organic  chemicals  4.0  4.0  4.1  4.0 
Synthetic  fibers  4.2  3.6  4.4  3.8 
Pesticides  5.1  3.9  4.8  4.6 
Textile  machinery  5.0  ...  5.0  ... 
All industries  4.5  4.0  5.0  4.8 
Source: Questionnaire on industrial research and development,  Yale University,  Research Program on Technological 
Change.  For  a description  of  survey  methods  and preliminary results,  see  R.  C.  Levin,  A.  K.  Klevorick,  R.  R. 
Nelson,  and  S.  G.  Winter,  "Survey  Research  on  R&D  Appropriability  and  Technological  Opportunity"  (Yale 
University,  July 1984). 
a. Questions  scored on a seven-point  Likert scale. 
responses from the same 130 industries  into quintiles. From this per- 
spective, the pesticide industry  falls into the highest  quintile  in the rate 
of product innovation. Textile machinery is in the second quintile, 
synthetic  fibers  is in the third,  and organic  and inorganic  chemicals  fall 
into the fourth  and  fifth  quintiles,  respectively. 
In their conclusion, Baily and Chakrabarti  imply that the source of 
productivity slowdown in other materials  processing industries was 
similar  to that of chemicals. It is certainly  a reasonable  conjecture  that 
these capital-  and  energy-intensive  sectors were particularly  hard  hit by 
increased energy prices and that they were particularly  ill-suited to 
respond flexibly to decreased demand. It also turns out that their 
innovation  experience  since 1970  has  paralleled  that  of the  basic  chemical 
industries.  Primary  aluminum,  copper,  lead, zinc, gypsum,  cement, and 
petroleum  refining  all rank  in the bottom  quintile  in the reported  rate of 
product  innovation.  Steel is one quintile  higher.  And all these industries 
except petroleum  and  cement  rank  in the bottom  two quintiles  in the rate 
of process innovation. 
Table 1 also summarizes  the impressions  of R&D executives con- 
cerning  the opportunities  for continued  technical  advance. Technology 
forecasts, even by experts, should not be taken very seriously as 
predictions, but these data might be regarded  as useful measures of 
interindustry  differences  in the degree  of optimism  about  technological 
prospects. It is encouraging  that across the spectrum  of manufacturing 
industries,  the average  opinion  is relatively  optimistic.  About  two-thirds Martin Neil Baily and Alok K. Chakrabarti  637 
of our respondents  rated  the prospects  for future  product  innovation  as 
better  than  the opportunities  available  during  the 1970s.  Only 11  percent 
regarded  future  prospects as worse. Opinions  concerning  the opportu- 
nities  for process innovation  were only slightly  less optimistic. 
In the chemical industries, however, increased opportunities  for 
innovation are not expected. This is somewhat surprising,  given the 
potential  application  of biotechnology  to chemical manufacturing  pro- 
cesses, although  respondents  in the drug  industry  do expect increased 
opportunities.  Elsewhere, materials  processing  industries  generally  do 
not  foresee much  improvement  in technological  opportunities,  and  some 
of the strong performers  of the 1970s, notably semiconductors  and 
communications  equipment,  have only an average  degree  of optimism. 
Optimism  about future  opportunities  is strongest  in two sectors: com- 
puters  and  instruments  of all types. 
General Discussion 
William Nordhaus cited disaggregated survey work of  the kind 
reported  by Martin  Baily and Alok Chakrabarti  as an important  step in 
sorting out the role that declining  innovation  may have played in the 
productivity  slowdown. He characterized  much previous work in this 
area as linking  research  inputs  (R&D spending)  to productivity  growth 
rates, without  paying  a great  deal of attention  to the black  box between 
the two, and applauded  the present  work as an effort to look inside the 
black box. Nordhaus noted that Jacob Schmookler  had put forth the 
view that  innovation  is driven  by demand  rather  than  being  determined 
exogenously. Richard Levin added that two recent studies, one by 
Vivian  Walsh  and  one by John  Beggs, have called the Schmookler  view 
into question. Neither of these recent studies  found clear evidence that 
swings in the number  of patents granted tracked swings in product 
demand.  Instead,  both  studies  supported  the view that  major  innovations 
cause growth  in demand  for the products  produced  using  the innovation, 
which in turn spawns  a large number  of patents representing  follow-up 
improvements  to the original innovation. Baily agreed that demand 
conditions  may affect the pace of innovation;  as an example, he men- 
tioned  that  in the company  interviews  conducted  for their  study, he and 
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not introduced  in 1975  because of weak demand. However, the major 
reason for the slowdown in the rate of innovation,  according  to those 
interviewed,  was the shortage  of technological  opportunities. 
George von Furstenberg  suggested that one important  difference 
between the textile industry  and  the chemical  industry  is that  the textile 
industry  is composed of many small  firms,  while the chemical  industry 
is much more concentrated. One implication  would seem to be that 
technological  opportunities  are largely  given from the point of view of 
the individual  textile firm,  whereas  they are apt to be endogenous  from 
the point of view of the individual  chemical  firm.  Von Furstenberg  also 
suggested that the availability  of licensing arrangements  may have an 
important  effect on the course of innovation.  Levin noted that his own 
research suggests that the appropriability  of returns  from innovation 
does have a strong  effect on the volume  of innovation,  though  his results 
bear  more  on cross-industry  differences  in the volume  of innovation  than 
on the time series pattern  of innovation. 
Christopher  Sims urged consideration  of the role that factor price 
changes may have played in inducing  innovation.  Before 1973,  Ameri- 
cans had spent decades figuring  out how to use cheap energy, he noted; 
since the increases in energy prices, innovation  has taken a decidedly 
different  course. Daniel  Mitchell  pointed  to data  in tables 3 and  7 of the 
paper showing a substantial  jump in energy-related  innovations  and a 
corresponding  drop in productivity-enhancing  process innovations in 
the chemical  industry  in the post-1973  period, but a much less marked 
jump  in energy-related  innovations  and  no drop  in productivity-enhanc- 
ing  innovations  in  the  textile  industry.  He found  the  difference  suggestive 
of a diversion  in R&D effort in the chemical  industry  following  the first 
oil price shocks. 
Nordhaus noted that the value of innovations tends to be highly 
skewed;  research  done by Michael  Scherer  during  the mid-1960s  on the 
value of patents showed that only a few patents turned  out to be very 
valuable. Just counting innovations  may not adequately  capture  what 
has happened  to innovative activity over time. Baily agreed with this 
observation,  but noted that when the main categories of innovation  in 
chemicals were classified by importance  and by type, the evidence of 
declining  innovation  after 1973  remained  strong. 
James  Duesenberry  noted  that  there  may  be substantial  lags between 
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majority  of producers in an industry. Linking current innovation to 
current  productivity  growth,  therefore,  may  be misleading;  instead,  one 
might  expect a link  between  lagged innovation  and  current  productivity 
growth. Baily responded  that the data on innovation  presented in the 
paper  are probably  best thought  of as capturing  the diffusion  of major 
innovations.  One good example  is the introduction  of air-jet  and water- 
jet looms in the textile industry.  These looms were first  invented  in the 
late 1960s;  however, successive generations  of innovations  were needed 
to adapt them to production  of various different  fabrics. These later 
innovations  are the ones being picked up in the Baily-Chakrabarti  data 
for the 1970s. 
Mitchell  asked  whether  the pattern  of productivity  growth  would  look 
different  if BLS volume of output measures  were used in place of the 
gross domestic  product  data  that  appear  in table 1. Baily stated  his belief 
that  the basic pattern  would  look similar  with BLS data  and  commented 
that each of the available  sources of productivity  data has its strengths 
and weaknesses. The BLS data  avoid problems  related  to the choice of 
an output  price deflator;  however, by using  a gross production  measure 
of output, these data ignore trends in the purchases  of material  inputs 
and services. 